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No. 57.

STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. LLOYD L. GAINES,
PETITIONER,
VS.
S. W. CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
MISSOURI, AND THE CURATORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,
RESPONDENTS.

RESPONDENTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF.

Petitioner has elected to stand upon the brief filed
in support of his petition for certiorari. Respondents stand
upon their brief filed in opposition to the granting of the
writ. Respondents also file and respectfully submit this
supplemental brief.
Petitioner, having refuse·d to, apply to the board of
curators of Lincoln University fo·r a legal education, is in
no position to co•n tend that that board would not have
furnished him the legal education provided by the Lincoln
University Act.

In our former brief (pages 34-38) we show that under
the Lincoln University Act (Secs. 9616-9624, R. S. Mo.~
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1929) it is the mandatory duty of the board of curators
of Lincoln University, upon petitioner's application, (a)
to establish a school of law in Lincoln University equal
to that in the University of Missouri, and to admit petitioner as a student therein; and (b) pending the establishment of such school of law, and as a temporary
matter, to arrange for the attendance of petitioner in
one or another of the schools of law already established
in the universities of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa or Illinois
( all of wl1ich admit negroes), and to pay his tuition fees
while he is attending such school.
At pages 60-61 of our former brief we refer to the
evidence showing that petitioner refused to avail himself of these provisions made by the state for his benefit
(Rec. 74, 82, 83, 84, 85-86, 218-219, 222).

The evidence shows without dispute that if petitioner
had requested the Lincoln University curators to fl!rnisl1
l1im facilities for education in the law, it would have been
entirely feasible for the board to have established a
school of law in that institution. On that point petitioner's witness, Dean W. E. Masterson, testified (Rec.
184-187):
"Q. Dean, in the light of the examination of Dr.
Elliff about the establishment of a law school at
LiE.eoln University-I want to ask you, as an educator
and as dean of the law school here what, in practical
effect, would have to . be done to set up a law school
at Lincoln University for the instruction in law of one
or two students. Just tell us what you would do
if you were setting out to do that.
A. You must first have a library, of course. I
understand they have that. Second, you would have
a place for meeting the student and reciting with him.
I understand they have that. Then, of course, you
must have competent instruction to teach a full year
curriculum. That would require, I should say, two
teachers of law. That would give them just about
the amount of law that the in;d ividual instructor on
the faculty here has at this university.
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Now at what expense could a law school ·b e established in Lincoln University for the instrt1ction
in law of one or two students, to give them st1ch law
school and standard of training equal to that in the
Missouri University Law School?
A. Since you have the library there and the buildings-about the only item of expense would be the
salaries of those two instructors.
Q. vVhat would that be, to get men of equal grade
with what you have in Missouri University?
A. I should say that you could get very excellent
teachers of law varying from $3,500.00 to $5,000.00
a year.
Q. Assuming tl1e top figure, could you establish a
law school in Lincoln University for the instruction
of one or two students and on a level of scholarship
and training equal to that in Missouri University for a
maximum of $10,000.00 a year?
A. I think so.
Q. If, on the other hand, a negro were admitted into
the Law School of the University of Missouri, and
educated in a separate class in accordance with the
public policy of the state, would not that expense to
the State of Missouri, to supply separate instructio11
in the Missouri University Law School be as great
as it would to establish it in Lincoln University?
A. It would, because our present teaching staff already have full classes. If ,ve gave additional instruction, in separate classes, it would require two
extra teachers.
Q. If there was a demand made upon Lincoln University board of curators to establish a law school in
Lincoln for one or two men students, and capable me11
of the k:ind you have been talking about would be_
employed to instruct that one or two students, would
they not, having the entire time and attention of their
instructors, receive at least as adequate instruction,
if not betterA. They would receiveQ. Than if they were members of a class of forty
students?
A. They would receive much better instruction.
Q.
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In the ordinary routine of instructing a class of
forty students or thirty to fifty students, a student, in
the nature of things, cannot recite often, can he?
A. He cannot.
Q. But with one or two students having the atten~
tion of the instructor, he would be practically having
a private tutor?
A. He would.
Q. Is that of value to a student?
A. Of great value."
Q.

The evidence also shows without dispute that Lincoln
University had ample funds with which to establish a
school of law (Rec. 147, and see Laws, Mo., 1935, p. 66).
The law presumes that if petitioner should apply
to the board of curators of Lincoln University for a legal
education, that board would perform its legal duty to
establish a school of law in that institution equal to the one
in the University of Missouri. This is but the application. of the general principle that the law presumes tl1at
a public officer charged with the performance of a certain duty will perform that duty. And even in those cases
where the performance of the duty involves the exercise
of some discretion, the law presumes that the officer wi,ll
properly exercise such discretion. In Hall v. Geiger-Jories
Company, 242 U. S. 539, 554, this court said:
"The discretion of the. commissioner is qualified
by his duty, and besides, as we have seen, the statute
gives judicial review of his action. Pending such
review we must accord to the commissioner a proper
sense of duty and the presumption that the · ft1nction3
entrusted to him will be executed in the public interest, not wantonly or arbitrarily to deny a license
to or take one away from a reputable dealer
(Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531,
(Italics ours).
545); * * *"

In Lehmann v. Stat_e Board of Public Accountancy,
263 U. S. 394, . 398, this court said:
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"Plaintiff in error puts some stress upon the absence of rules by the board, urging that the statute is
in conflict with the Constitution of the United States
because it purports to authorize the revocation of a
certificate 'without defining or determining in advance
what grounds or facts or acts shall be sufficient cause
for such revocation.' Such absence permits, it is
asserted, arbitrary action. We cannot yield to that
assertion or assume that the board will be impelled
to action by other than a sense of duty or render
judgment except upon convincing evidence introduced in a regular way with opportunity of rebuttal.
We certainly cannot restrain the board upon the
possibility of contrary action. Official bodies would
be of no use as instruments of government if they
could be prevented from action by the supposition of
wrongful action.''*

In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165,
190, this court said:
"It is said that the commissioner, who administers
the act, has not provided for these deductions or the
means for determining them. But the commissioner
must administer the act as it is construed, and it is
not to be supposed that he will not now properly
do so."

In Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation
Commission of Virginia, 236 U. S. 699, 701, this court
said:
"The general principle is that it is not for the
courts to stop officers of this kind from performing
their statutory duty for fear · that they should perform it wrongly. First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v.
Albright, 208 U. S. 548, 553."
In Pl1,;mouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of Penrisylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 545, this court said:
"It is to be presumed, until the contrary appears,
· that the administrative body would have acted with

*All italics in all quotations in this brief are ours.

6

reasonab le, regard to the property rights of plaintiff
in error; and certainly if there had been any arbitrary exercise of its powers its determin ation would
have been subject to judicial review. Lieberm an v.
Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 562; Bradley v. Ric1imorid,
227 U. S. 477, 483."
In Bradley v. Richmon d, 227 U. S. 477, 483, this co11rt
said:
"But it is said that after all there is no security
that the city council will not in the end approve of
a scheme of classifica tion operatin g most unjustly.
The same objection might be made with reference to
any tribunal required to determin e such a matter.
The presump tions which must be indulged run,
counter to the suggestio n made."
Petitione r is in no position to contend that, if he had
applied, the curators of Lincoln Universi ty would not l1ave
furnished him the legal educatio11 provided by the Lincoln
Universi ty Act. And petitione r is in no position ·t o contend for the right to admissio n in the Universi ty of Missouri, if the legal educatio n available to him ( either in
a law school in Lincoln Universi ty equal to the law
school in the Universi ty of Missouri , or in a law school
in an adjacent state universit y) afforded him opportun ity
for a legal educatio n substant ially equal to that provided
for white citizens of the state. This is true because it
is to be presume d that the Lincoln Universi ty curators
would have afforded him the fullest rights to which the
Lincoln Universi ty Act entitled h-im. For these reasons
the question of the constitut ionality of the provisior1 for
out-of-st ate instructi on is not presente d for review. This
because, petitione r never having made any applicati on to
Lincoln Universi ty for a legal educatio n in that institution, it is entirely impossib le to know whether the curators
of that institutio n, had he applied, would have immediatel y establish ed a law course there, equal to the
one in the Universi ty of Missouri , and thereby have ren-
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dered it unnecessary for petitioner to go out of the state
for a legal education.
In the effort to avoid tl1e effect of his refusal to apply
to Lincoln University, petitio11er in effect ask:s this court
to assum~ that if he had so applied his application would
have been rejected. In the first place, there is absolutely
no evidence upon which to base any such assumption.
In the second place, petitioner's position is directly in
conflict with the presumption that the Lincoln University
board would have properly and justly performed its duty.
In the third place, petitioner's contention is in conflict
with the rule that no one is entitled to judicial relief until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.
In Myf!-.rs v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303
U. S. 41, 50-51, 58 Sup. Ct. Rep. 459, 463, this court said:
"The corporation contends that, since it denies
that interstate or foreign commerce is involved a11d
claims that a hearing would subject it to irreparable
damage, rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution will be denied unless it be held that the district
court has jurisdiction to enjoin tl1e holding of a
hearing by the board. So to hold would, as the
government insists, in effect substitute the district
court for the board as the tribunal to hear and determine what Congress declared the board exclusively
should hear and determine in the first instance. The
contention is at war with the long-settled rule of
judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until
the prescrib.e d administrative remedy has been exhausted."
In Highland Farrns Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608,
616-617, this court said:

"One who is required to take out a
not be heard to complain, in advance of
that there is da11ger of refusal. Lehon
242 U. S. 53, 56; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.
He sliould a.p ply and see what happens."

license will
application,
v. Atlanta,
S. 553, 562.

8

In Petroleum Exploration, Inc., v. Public Service Commission, 304 U. S. 209, 222-3, 58 Sup. Ct. Rep. 834, 841, this
court said:
"By the process of injunction the federal courts
are asked to stop, at the threshold, the effort of the
Public Service Commission of Kentucky to investigate
matters entrusted to its care by a statute of that
commonwea lth obviously within the bounds of state
authority in many of its provisions. The preservation
of the autonomy of the states is fundamental in our
constitutiona l system. The extraordinar y powers of
injunction should be employed to interfere with the
action of the state or the depositaries of its delegated
powers, only when it clearly appears that the weight
of co11.venience is upon t):ie side of the protestant.
'Only a case of manifest oppression will ju.stify a
federal court in laying such a check upon administrative officers acting colore officii in a conscientious
endeavor to fulfill their duty to t1ie state.' "
In Bourjois, Inc., v. C1iapman, 301 U. S. 183, 188, the
complainant sought to enjoin enforcement of an act
regulating cosmetics, which act required registration of
cosmetics and gave a board power to refuse certificates to
preparations containing harmful ingredients. In its opinion this court said:
"The plaintiff conte.n ds that in other respects the
statute violates rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Constitution of the State. It
objects that the power conferred upon the board to
grant or deny a certificate is unlimited; that the board
has issued no regulations; and that neither the statute
nor the board has provided for hearing an applicant.
The plaintiff has not applied for a certificate; and
it is not to be assumed that, if it concludes to· do so,
its application will be refu.sed, or that the board will
deny any right to· which it is entitled."
In Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 309, the
complainant brought suit to enjoin the Illinois Commerce
Commission from enforcing an order by which the . gas
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company was required to open its books to the commission
and furnish certain statistical data for use in a proceeding
pending against it. The gas company contended that the
commission would arbitrarily make use of the data in
fixing the comp9-ny's rates. In dealing with that contention, this court said:
''It will be time enough to challenge such action
of the commission when it is taken or at least
threatened, First National Bank v. Albright, 208 U.
S. 548; Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 236 U. S. 699, and to consider whether
appellant has standing to make the challenge."
In Goldsniith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117,
123, Goldsmith, a certified public accountant, brought suit
for mandamus against the Board of Tax Appeals, to compel
the board to enroll him as an attorney with the right to
practice before it. The board set up grounds for its refusal to adrr1it him to practice before it. In affirrning the
refusal of mandamus, this court said:
"The petitioner as an applicant for admission to
practice was, therefore, entitled to demand fro1n the
board the right to be heard on the charges against
him upon which the board has denied him admission.
But he made no demand of this kind. Instead of
doing so, he filed this petition in mandamus in which
he asked for a writ to compel the board summarily
to enroll him in the list of practitioners, and to enjoin it frorn interfering with his representing clients
before it. He was not entitled to this on his petition. Until he had sought a hearing from the board,
and been denied it he could not appeal to the courts
for any remedy and certainly not for mandamus to
compel enrollment."
In Gu1idling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186, the plaintiff in error was ~onvicted in a police court for violation
of an ordinance of Chicago forbidding the sale of cigarettes
without a license. He challenged the constitutionality
of the ordinance, on the ground that it granted arbitrary

10
power to the mayor to grant or refuse a license thereunder. This court said:
"It seems somewhat doubtful whether the plaintiff in error is in a position to raise the question of
the invalidity of the ordinance because of the alleged
arbitrary power of the mayor to grant or refuse it.
He made no application for a license, and of course
the mayor has not refused it. Non constat, that l1e
would have refused it if application had been made
by the plaintiff in error. Whether the discretion of
the mayor is arbitrary or not would seem to be unimportant to the plaintiff in error so long as he made
no application for the exercise of that discretion in
. his favor and was not refused a license."
In S·mitli v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 561-2, the appellant, a private carrier for hire, was arrested upon a warrant charging him with operating vel1icles upon the highways of Florida without a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The appellant challenged the validity
of the statute requiring such a certificate. In the course
of its opinion this ·court said:
"From statements made at tl1e bar, it would appear that the appellant was engaged in the business
above mentioned wl1en the act was passed and hence
that he would be entitled to a certificate, provided he
complied fully with the provisions of the act. By the
terms of the act such compliance would be necessary.
The appellant did not apply for a certificate, and the
principle is well established that when a statute, valid
upon its face, requires the issue of a license or certificate as a condition precedent to carrying on a
business or following a vocation, one who is within
the terms of the statute, but has failed to make the
required application, is not at liberty to com,plain
because of his anticipation of improp_er or invalid
action in administration."
See, also, Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461,
468, 471; Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53~ 55-6;
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 56'2; Ex Parte
Virginia Commissioners, 112 U. S. 177.
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It is respectfully submitted that petitioner, having
wholly disregarded and refused to avail himself of the
facilities provided by the State for his benefit, is in no
position to have the relief he seeks.
Respectfully submitted,
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